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4:~8 S'rATE FAR::Vf ETC. INs. Co. v. SuPERIOR CouR'r r 47 C.2d 
F. No.19562. In Bank. Dec. 4, 
STA'fE FAR1VI MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY Corporation), Petitioner, v. THE SU-
PERIOR COlTH:r OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF 
SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; HEI1EN CORRICK 
et Real Parties in Interest. 
[la, lb] Trial-Joint and Separate Trials-Consolidation.-The 
trial court abused its discretion in ordering consolidation for 
trial of a declaratory relief action by an insurer against its 
policyholder to determine whether the policy covered a collision 
of vehicles, one of which was operated by the insured, and 
seYeral personal injury actions filed against the insured, where 
the consolidation resulted in prejudice to the insurer (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1048) in that in the declaratory relief action the 
insurer would be urging on its own behalf that the insured's 
riders were passengers "for a charge" within the meaning of 
the policy, but in defending the insured in the personal injury 
actions the insurer would be urging on the insured's behalf that 
his riders were guests within the meaning of the guest statute, 
so that the insured would be liable only in the event of proof 
of wilful misconduct (Veh. Code, § 403), and where the con-
solidation would confuse the jury in determining under differ-
ing tests set out in the instructions the consequences of any 
particular factual situation found to exist. 
[2] Judgments-Declaratory Judgments-Effect of Issues of Fact. 
-If the issues of fact arising would have been triable by a 
jury as of right in an action which might have been substi-
tuted for a declaratory relief action by either party, there is 
a right to jury trial on such issues. 
[3] !d.-Declaratory Judgments-Effect of Issues of Fact.-The 
court in a declaratory relief action may not, regardless of the 
circumstances, dispose of all factual issues without a jury, 
since this would not preserve the distinction between legal 
and equitable issues. (Disapproving contrary holding m 
Kaliterna v. Wright, 94 Cal.App.2d 926, 212 P.2d 32.) 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trial, § 5; Am.Jur., Trial, §53 et seq. 
[2] Jury trial in action for declaratory relief, note, 13 A.L.R.2d 
777. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 43; Am.Jur., Decla-
ratory .Tudgments, § 70. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trial, § 5; [2-4] Judgments, § 9(2); 
[5] Mandamus,§ 41; Appeal and Error,§ 1223; [7] Mandamus, 
§ 15(5); [8] Judgments, 13; [9] Judgments,§ 14; [10] Mandamus, 
§55. 
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[4] !d.-Declaratory Judgments-Effect of Issues of Fact.-The 
courts will not permit a relief action to be used 
as a device to circumvent the to a trial in cases 
where such would be if the were 
coerci\·e rather than 
[5) Mandamus-To Courts.~J\Iandate lies control dis-
cretion when such discretion has been abused. 
[6] Appeal-Discretion of Lower Court-When Abused.-Discrc-
tion is abused whenever, in it,; a court exceeds the 
bounds of reason, all circmnstancPs before it being considered. 
[7] Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.--An order of con-
solidation is not appealable (Code Civ. Proc., § 9G3), but is 
reviewable only on appeal [rom a subsequent judgment, and a 
writ of mandate ordering a severance will issue where the 
remedy by appeal would be inadequate. 
[8] Judgments-Declaratory Judgments-Discretion of Court.-
'fhe entertainment of a declaratory relief action and the 
granting of such relief are within the discretionary power of 
the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.) 
[9] !d.-Declaratory Judgments-Discretion of Court.-While 
Code Civ. Proc., § 10G2a, provides that declaratory relief actions 
shall be set [or trial at the earliest possible date and ordinarily 
shall take precedence over all other cases, such section does 
not override the discretionary power given the trial court to 
refuse to exercise the power granted it in any case where its 
declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the 
time under all circumstances. (Code Ci v. Proc., § 1061.) 
(10] Mandamus-To Courts-TriaL-Though personal InJury 
actions against the insured were in issue and set for trial 
before a declaratory relief action by the insurer was at issue, 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1063a, was not intended to compel the trial 
court under such circumstances to delay the trial of the 
coercive actions until after trial of the declaratory relief 
action merely because the coercive actions might involve deter-
mination of the same or a somewhat similar issue. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco to sever a declaratory 
relief action from personal injury actions and to proceed :first 
with trial of the declaratory relief action. Writ granted solely 
for purpose of compelling court to sever the actions. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., l\Iandamus, § 34; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 259. 
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Bledsoe, Smith, Cathcart, Johnson & Phelps and Joseph W. 
Rogers, Jr., for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Delany, Fishgold & Freitas and Matthew M. Fishgold for 
Real Parties in Interest. 
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel 
respondent court to sever its declaratory relief action from 
certain personal injury actions and to proceed first with the 
trial of its declaratory relief action. It contends that respond-
ent court abused its discretion (1) in ordering the consoli-
dation for trial of the declaratory relief action and the personal 
injury actions; and (2) in failing to order that the declaratory 
relief action be tried prior to the trial of the personal injury 
actions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1062a.) We have concluded that 
petitioner's position should be sustained as to the first point 
but not as to the second point. 
Petitioner commenced a declaratory relief action against its 
policyholder Collins to determine whether its policy covered 
a collision of two automobiles, one of which was operated by 
Collins. Persons riding in both cars were injured. While 
the declaratory relief action was pending, several personal 
injury actions were filed against Collins. The personal injury 
actions were at issue and were consolidated for a jury triaL 
Thereafter the declaratory relief action was set for trial, 
with a jury as demanded by defendants, and for the same 
clay previously set for trial of the personal injury actions. 
Petitioner's motion to vacate the order for a jury trial in the 
declaratory relief action was denied, and defendants' motion 
to consolidate that action with the personal injury actions 
was then granted. The trial date for the personal injury 
actions was not a date certain but the time when the cases 
should be ready for trial and thereafter would "trail," subject 
to being called for assignment when a department was avail-
able. 
[la] Petitioner concedes that ''actions may be consoli-
dated, in the discretion of the court, whenever it can be done 
without prejudice to a substantial right.'' (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1048.) However, as petitioner contends, the consolidation 
here does result in such prejudice to petitioner. In seeking 
damages against Collins for their injuries, the riders in his 
car charged him with both negligence and wilful misconduct 
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but did not allege their status, whether passengers or guests, 
at the time of the accident. Petitioner's policy provided that 
there was no coverage while the insured's automobile was 
''used as a public or livery conveyance, or used for carrying 
persons for a charge,'' with the exception of persons sharing 
expenses, going to and from work or school. The order for 
consolidation puts petitioner in an inconsistent position for 
argument of the status of Collins' riders in the consolidated 
actions: in the declaratory relief action petitioner would 
be urging on its own behalf that Collins' riders were pas-
sengers ''for a charge'' within the meaning of the policy; but 
( 2) in defending Collins in the personal injury actions, peti-
tioner would be urging on Collins' behalf that his riders were 
guests within the meaning of the guest statute, so that Collins 
would be liable only in the event of proof of wilful misconduct. 
(Veh. Code, §403; Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal.App.2d 761 [143 
P.2d 940, 145 P.2d 561].) The tests for determining these 
respective issues in the actions thus consolidated would not be 
the same. A person may be a traveler for ''compensation'' 
under the guest law but not necessarily a "passenger" for 
"consideration" or "for a charge" under an insurance policy. 
(Westem JJiach. Co. V. Bankers Indem. Ins. ao., 10 Cal.2d 
488, 490-491 [75 P.2d 609] ; Porter v. Employers etc. Corp., 
Ltd., 40 Cal.App.2d 502, 506-510 [104 P.2d 1087].) Substan-
tially the same evidence might be involved in the adjudication 
of these issues, but petitioner would be forced into contra-
dictory arguments based upon conflicting testimony, or at 
least upon conflicting inferences arising from the evidence, 
with regard to these distinguishable relationships. Moreover, 
the consolidation would unquestionably confuse the jury in 
determining under differing tests set out in the instructions 
the consequences of any particular factual situation which the 
jury might find to exist. 
Petitioner does not now challenge the propriety of respond-
ent's granting a jury trial in the declaratory relief action. 
[2] The general rule is stated in 13 American Law Reports 
2d at page 778: " ... if the issues of fact arising would have 
been triable by a jury as of right in an action which might 
have been substituted for the declaratory judgment action by 
either party, then there is a right to jury trial on such issues.'' 
[3] While Kaliterna v. Wright, 94 Cal.App.2d 926 [212 P.2d 
32], appears to hold that, regardless of the circumstances, the 
court in a declaratory relief action may dispose of all factual 
issues without a jury, such view fails to preserve the distinc-
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tion between and equitable and it must be dis-
approved. (See Robinson v. Pnls, 28 Cal.2d 664, 665-666 [171 
P.2d 430]. [4] In short, the "courts will not permit the 
declaratory action to be used as a device to circumvent the 
right to a jury trial in cases where such right would be guar-
anteed if the proceeding were coercive rather than declaratory 
in nature." (15 § pp. 172-173; see Pacific 
Electric Ry. Co. v. Dewey, 95 Ca1.App.2d 71-72 [212 
P.2d 255] ; JJiallarino v. Cmtrt, 115 Cal.App.2d 781, 
784 [252 P.2d .) [lb] However, petitioner properly 
complains of the order for consolidation here in that it pro· 
vides for the trial of both the declaratory relief action and 
the personal injury actions before the same jury. The fact 
of Collins' liability insurance would thus be disclosed to the 
jury which would be determining the issues involved in the 
personal injury actions, a circumstance which is generally 
held a matter of prejudice. (See cases collected: 11 So. Cal. 
hRev. 407; 21 So.Cal.IJ.Rev. 227.) It is therefore clear 
that the declaratory relief action and the personal injury 
actions could not be consolidated for trial "without prejudice 
to a substantial right" of petitioner, and that the trial court 
abused its discretion in ordering such consolidation. 
[5] Mandate lies to control judicial discretion when that 
discretion has been abused. (Hays v. Superior Court, 16 
Cal.2d 260, 265 [105 P.2d 975] ; Simmons v. Superior Cmtrt, 
96 Cal.App.2d 119, 132 [214 P.2d 844, 19 A.L.R.2d 288] ; 
Grorneeko v. Superior Court, 114 Cal.App.2d 754, 757 [251 
P.2d 29].) [6] "In a legal sense discretion is abused when-
ever in the exercise of its discretion the court exceeds the 
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being 
considered." (Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 669, 672 [169 
P.2d 453] .) [7] An order of consolidation is not appeal-
able (Code Civ. Proc., § 963) but is reviewable only upon 
appeal from a subsequent judgment, which remedy would not 
be adequate under the circumstances above reviewed. (l.E.S. 
Corp. v. Super-ior Co1£rt, 44 Cal.2d 559, 564 [283 P.2d 700] ; 
see Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 370 [217 P.2d 
951].) We therefore conclude that petitioner is entitled to 
a writ of mandate ordering respondent to sever its declaratory 
relief action from the personal injury actions. 
[8] However, petitioner may not insist that the declara-
tory relief action be tried first. The entertainment of such 
action and the granting of declaratory relief are matters 
within the discretionary power of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., 
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1061; Hannula v. Hacienda Inc., 34 Cal.2d 442, 448 
[211 P.2d 302, 19 A.L.R.2d 1268] .) (9] It is true that it 
is provided that such actions "shall be set for trial at the 
earliest possible date and shall take of all other 
cases, except older matters of the same character and matters 
to which special precedence may be by law." (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1062a.) But said section 1062a does not purport 
to override the discretionary power given to the trial court 
to ''refuse to exercise the power granted by this chapter in 
any ease where its declaration or determination is not neces-
sary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.'' (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1061.) The trial court therefore had, and still 
has, the discretion to determine whether the declaratory relief 
action should be entertained ''at the time under all the cir-
cumstances.'' In the present case, the personal injury actions 
were at issue and set for trial before the declaratory relief 
action was at issue. (10] In our view, section 1062a was 
never intended under such circumstances to compel the trial 
court to delay the trial of the coercive actions until after the 
trial of the declaratory relief action merely because the 
coercive actions might involve the determination of the same 
or a somewhat similar issue. Any conclusion to the contrary 
would permit the use of an action for declaratory relief as 
a device to delay the trial of any such coercive action pre-
viously at issue and set for trial. vVe therefore conclude that 
the trial court could have properly determined in its discre-
tion, and may still determine following the severance, that 
the granting of declaratory relief is not "necessary or proper 
at the time under all the circumstances." There is therefore 
no basis for the issuance of a writ of mandate commanding the 
trial court to order the trial of the declaratory relief action 
prior to the trial of the personal injury actions. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue but solely for the 
purpose of commanding respondent court to sever for trial 
petitioner's declaratory relief action from the personal injury 
actions hereinabove discussed. 
Gibson, C .• J., Shenk, J., 'l'raylor, J., Schauer, J., and 
McComb, ,J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority holds that a trial court eannot in the exercise 
of its discretion consolidate for trial an action by the plaintiff-
insurer for declaratory J'elief to ascertain the rights and lia-
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bilities of the insurer and the insured under a policy of 
public liability insurance on an automobile in which defendant 
Collins is the insured, with an action by other plaintiffs 
against Collins for personal injuries suffered by them when 
riding with Collins in the automobile covered by such policy; 
that mandamus is the appropriate method for reviewing the 
consolidation order. It bases that holding on two grounds: 
(1) That the insurer would be required to take inconsistent 
positions in that it would argue that the personal injury 
plaintiffs were passengers for hire and not covered by Collins' 
policy on the one hand, and, as to the liability of Collins to 
plaintiffs on the other, that they were mere guests, and wilful 
misconduct by Collins would have to be shown to establish 
his liability; ( 2) that the insurance coverage of Collins would 
be injected into the personal injury action because of its con-
solidation with the declaratory relief action contrary to the 
rule that the existence of insurance should be withheld from 
the jury. I do not believe that either of these grounds will 
stand analysis and that in any case mandamus is not the 
proper remedy. 
With respect to the inconsistent positions which it is claimed 
the consolidation will require the insurer to take, it should 
be first observed that the majority is itself inconsistent as it 
arrives at the conclusion of inconsistent positions while at the 
same time holding that a different test must be applied to 
determine whether the personal injury plaintiffs were fare-
paying passengers and not covered by the policy, and to deter-
mine whether plaintiffs were guests, and hence whether negli· 
gence or wilful misconduct must be proved.* There being a 
different test, the insurer is not required to take inconsistent 
positions. Hence there is no merit in that ground for denying 
consolidation of the actions. 
In addition, however, it should be noted that law suits are 
not games in which the cleverest mover should prevail. The 
ultimate factor involved is getting at the true facts and that 
should not depend on some nice consideration for the conten-
tions that may or may not be made by the opposing parties. 
The insurer's position should be to urge what the evidence 
fairly shows. The facts being ascertained, the law must be 
applied thereto. Suppose the actions were not consolidated, 
*It has been held (as stated by the majority) that the tests as to the 
coverage of the policy and whether there is a passenger or guest relation-
ship are different (Western Mach. Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 10 
Cal.2d 488 [75 P.2d 609]; Porter v. Employers' etc. Corp., Ltd., 40 Cal. 
App.2d 502 [104 P.2d 1087] 
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would it be proper for the insurer to argue in one action 
(declaratory relief) that the policy did not cover the accident 
because the vehicle was for hire, and in the other, that it 
was not, and thus plaintiffs were guests and must, therefore, 
prove wilful misconduct on Collins' part 1 There would not 
only be the ''embarrassment' of taking inconsistent positions, 
assuming the positions would be incongruous, but there might 
be a serious question as to whether both could stand on appeal. 
As said in Southern Pac. Co. v. C'ity of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 
545, 548 [55 P.2d 847], speaking of two actions tried separately 
in which different results were reached on substantially the 
same evidence: ''It would be most anomalous for such deci-
sions to stand, reaching diametrically opposite conclusions as 
to the legal effect of the same occurrence, where the essential 
facts are similarly presented, and are in most particulars un-
disputed. The rule that a reviewing court is bound by the 
findings of the trial court on conflicting evidence cannot apply 
to a situation such as this, where two lower courts, dealing 
with substantially the same evidence, have reached different 
conclusions of law, on the legal issue of whether from this 
evidence legal responsibility is imposed by the law upon the 
defendant. It is within the proper function of this court, 
upon petition for hearing, to eliminate this confusion, and to 
determine the legal effect of the evidence in both cases.'' Thus 
I see nothing more disadvantageous to the insurer in trying 
the matters together than in trying them separately. If incon-
sistent positions must be taken, that is because of the situation 
presented over which none of the parties had control; it was 
not created by the order for consolidation for trial. It must 
be remembered that the same evidence, testimony of witnesses 
(plaintiffs and Collins), as to the nature of the arrangement 
between them in connection with their presence in Collins' 
car would be used in both trials or one if there is consolidation. 
Both parties will have to rely on the same witnesses, and the 
inconsistency of positions, if there be such, is no greater for 
the insurer than for the plaintiffs and Collins. If plaintiffs 
establish only ordinary negligence they will want to urge that 
there was a passenger-driver rather than guest-host relation-
ship and thus risk having no coverage under the policy. It is 
not reasonable to suppose that they want to jeopardize any 
recovery by excluding the insurer as the one who would ulti-
mately have to pay. Yet they make no objection to the con-
solidation; in fact, they initiated the move to obtain it. All 
parties will have to do what is required of them in an endeavor 
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ascertain the true facts. At least that is a factor which 
could have been considered the trial court when it exercised 
its discretion and consolidated the actions. 
In regard to the existence of insurance coming before th!:' 
it is clear that the insurer took the calculated risk of 
that occur. In action it named plaintiffs as well 
as Collins defendants and claimed that a trial was not 
proper. It thus made known that plaintiffs were possible 
claimants in a injury action against Collins in which 
it would be involved, and no doubt it considered that a judg-
ment after a court trial in its favor would end the matter, or 
in the event it lost, that it could still litigate the issue of 
Collins' liability to plaintiffs. 'I' his considered course of con-
duct is tantamount to a 'Naiver on its part of the issue of 
insurance coming into the case. It should have anticipated 
that with plaintiffs named as defendants along with Collins in 
its action, the evidence on the issue of insurance coverage 
and liability would come from Collins and those plaintiffs 
seeking damages for personal injuries against him, and that 
the actions would be consolidated to save the duplication of 
their testimony in two separate trials. Since the insurer's 
action is one which may be tried by a jury, as held by the 
majority, and the personal injury plaintiffs were defendants 
in that action, the jury necessarily would be informed that 
insurance was involved, it is not reasonable to hold that the 
insurer has not forfeited any right to have insurance kept out 
of the consolidated trial. The insurance issue was just as 
much likely to affect the jury in one case as in the consolidated 
cases. Moreover, •vith all the recent publicity that has been 
given to insurance in automobile accident cases, stressing the 
effect on premiums for such insurance, it cannot be said that 
jurors are ignorant on the subject, nor that the insurers want 
them to be. The claimed danger of injection of insurance 
into the case has lost much of the sting assumed to exist 
formerly. In recent widespread publicity jurors have been 
told generally not to give large awards of damages and to 
avoid g·iving any except in the clearest cases. Wbile it is 
true that in an ordinary personal injury action, with minor 
exceptions, the existence of insurance is not material to any 
issue, it must be assumed that the jurors know that all motor-
ists carry insurance. Where actions such as these are consoli-
dated and insurance is material and relevant, the mention of 
the insurance issue cannot possibly be considered prejudicial 
to the insurer. 
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The discussion of waiver also stands as an answer 
to the asserted embarrassment of the insurer in taking incon-
sistent positions. If the positions are inconsistent the insurer 
has brought it on itself. It should be remembered that 
inconsistent positions may be taken a in his com-
plaint or by a defendant in the defenses pleaded in his 
answer and no one is considered to be prejudicially embar-
rassed thereby. (21 CaLJur. 134-136; 9 So.CaLIJ.Rev. 388.) 
Mandamus should not be granted in this case. There was 
no palpable abuse of discretion by the trial court. The major-
ity opinion fails to give consideration to all of the factors 
considered by the trial court when it exercised its admitted 
discretion and ordered consolidation. 
It should first be noted that the basis of the majority finding 
of abuse of discretion is wholly speculative and conjecturaL 
It is supposed that the evidence will be such that the insurer 
will have to argue for different results-one as to the insurance 
policy coverage and the other as to the relation between 
Collins and the riders in his car. \Ve do not know whether 
that is true or not because we do not know what the evidence 
will be; it may be that it will not call for any inconsistent 
construction. As to the issue of insurance we should not 
suppose that the jury will not be instructed to ignore the 
insurance element in considering the liability of Collins to 
plaintiffs in the personal injury action and that such instruc-
tions will be followed. The majority opinion assumes without 
so stating that there will be no such instructions or at least 
that the jury will not follow them. None of these things will 
be known with clarity and certainty until after the consoli-
dated cases are tried. Only then will this court be in a position 
to ascertain whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. 
Therefore mandamus is not the proper remedy at tl1is time. 
The matter may be fairly determined only on appeal from the 
judgment where the record will disclose what occurred at the 
trial, and there may not be any claim of error insofar as the 
question of consolidation is concerned, assuming the insurer 
and Collins lose in the trial court. If they win, of course, 
the question is moot. 
The witnesses, including Collins, wl1o would be conversant 
with the arrangement between Collins and plaintiffs are non-
residents and hence the difficulty and expense of having their 
testimony available at two separate trials, if the cases are not 
consolidated, is patent; yet the majority gives no considera-
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tion to that factor in determining whether the trial court 
abused its discretion. 
All of the foregoing matters point unerringly to a proper 
exercise by the trial court of its discretion. It had to balance 
those factors in arriving at a decision to consolidate the cases. 
The majority does not show that the trial court did not weigh 
the pertinent problems or that its sense of where the merits 
fell was wanting in reasonableness or propriety. 
It is obvious that this case will become the basis for numer-
ous attempts of litigants to control the discretion of trial 
courts in similar cases and thus interrupt the orderly disposi-
tion of business by our greatly overworked trial courts. 
I would deny the petition for the writ. 
[Crim. No. 5931. In Bank. Dec. 4, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CLIFFORD JEFFERSON, 
Appellant. 
[la, lb] Assault-By Life Convict-Indictment.-In a prosecution 
for assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner undergoing a 
life sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500), it was not error to deny de-
fendant's motion to set aside the indictment where the evi-
dence before the grand jury disclosed that another prisoner 
was waylaid by three men, two of whom had knives, that de-
fendant was one of the men who had a knife, and that he in-
flicted wounds on such prisoner, since there was probable 
ground for the grand jury's conclusion that defendant com-
mitted the offense charged. (Pen. Code, § 995, subd. 2.) 
[2] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-Objections 
to Grand Jurors .. -An indictment may not be set aside under 
Pen. Code, § 995, on the ground that the foreman of the grand 
jury did not comply with the requirements of Pen. Code, § 907, 
requiring that he state the matter to be considered, the person 
to be charged with an offense, and direct any prejudiced juror 
to retire. 
[3] Assault-By Life Convict-Validity of Statute.-Pen. Code, 
§ 4500, making it an offense punishable with death for a life 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Indictment and Information, ~ 80; Am.Jur., 
Indictment and Information, § 157. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 9] Assault, § 4'1; [2] Indictment and 
Information,§ 88(3); [3, 4, 8] Assault,§ 43; 10] Assault,§ 45; 
[6, 7] Assault, § 46; [11] Evidence, § 33; [12] Assault, § 47.1; 
[13] Criminal Law,§ 970(4). 
